An Expressivist Theory of Taste Predicates

Philosophers' Imprint 24 (1) (2024)
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Abstract

Simple taste predications come with an acquaintance requirement: they require the speaker to have had a certain kind of first-hand experience with the object of predication. For example, if I tell you that the creme caramel is delicious, you would ordinarily assume that I have actually tasted the creme caramel and am not simply relying on the testimony of others. The present essay argues in favor of a 'lightweight' expressivist account of the acquaintance requirement. This account consists of a recursive semantics and an account of assertion; it is compatible with a number of different accounts of truth and content, including contextualism, relativism, and purer forms of expressivism. The principal argument in favor of this account is that it correctly predicts a wide range of data concerning how the acquaintance requirement interacts with Boolean connectives, generalized quantifiers, epistemic modals, and attitude verbs.

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Dilip Ninan
Tufts University

Citations of this work

Assertion, Evidence, and the Future.Dilip Ninan - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (4):405-451.
The Acquaintance Inference and Hybrid Expressivism.Jochen Briesen - 2025 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 103 (1):133-156.
Aesthetic Judgments, Evaluative Content, and (Hybrid) Expressivism.Jochen Briesen - 2024 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 11.
Judging for ourselves.Justin Khoo - 2025 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 110 (3):757-788.
Modality and the Future.Dilip Ninan - 2025 - Analysis 85 (2):515-527.

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References found in this work

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Common ground.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5):701-721.
Studies in the Way of Words.Paul Grice - 1989 - Philosophy 65 (251):111-113.

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