IX—Presupposition, Disagreement, and Predicates of Taste

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (2pt2):163-173 (2013)
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Abstract

ABSTRACTI offer a simple‐minded analysis of presupposition in which if a sentence has a presupposition, then both that sentence and its negation logically entail the presupposition; and in which sentence with failed presuppositions are neither true nor false. This account naturally generates an analysis of what it takes to disagree and what it takes to be at fault in a disagreement. A simple generalization gives rise to the possibility of disagreements in which no party is at fault, as is required by leading theories on predicates of taste.

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Josh Parsons
PhD: Australian National University; Last affiliation: University of Otago

Citations of this work

XII—The Distinction in Kind between Knowledge and Belief.Maria Rosa Antognazza - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (3):277-308.
Minimal Disagreement.Dan Zeman - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1649-1670.
Essence, Experiment, and Underdetermination in the Spinoza-Boyle Correspondence.Stephen Harrop - 2022 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 12 (2):447-484.

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References found in this work

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