Relativism about predicates of personal taste and perspectival plurality

Linguistics and Philosophy 40 (1):37-60 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper we discuss a phenomenon we call perspectival plurality, which has gone largely unnoticed in the current debate between relativism and contextualism about predicates of personal taste. According to perspectival plurality, the truth value of a sentence containing more than one PPT may depend on more than one perspective. Prima facie, the phenomenon engenders a problem for relativism and can be shaped into an argument in favor of contextualism. We explore the consequences of perspectival plurality in depth and assess several possible responses on behalf of advocates of relativism.

Other Versions

No versions found

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-12-17

Downloads
1,822 (#18,764)

6 months
221 (#40,907)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Markus Kneer
University of Graz
Dan Zeman
University of Porto
Agustin Vicente
University of the Basque Country

References found in this work

Relativism and Monadic Truth.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by John Hawthorne.
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein, Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Summary.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):109-111.
Index, context, and content.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Stig Kanger & Sven Öhman, Philosophy and Grammar. Reidel. pp. 79-100.

View all 47 references / Add more references