Medieval Metaphysics

In the philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa, the relationship between God and His Creation is a difficult and elusive matter. The following essay is an analysis of Cusanus’ idea of God as “Not-Other”—a concept that he develops in his 1461 dialogue, De li Non-Aliud (On the Not-Other). The main thesis propounded in the dialogue is that conceiving God as “Not-Other” is the least inadequate way for us to direct our minds towards the Divine. By diving into this difficult text, and (...) defending Cusanus’ ideas against potential criticisms, we can see how “Not-Other”—this elusive symbol, this perplexing double negation—provides us with a compass pointing the way towards a radically transcendent and radically immanent God. (shrink)

A lo largo de la obra de Tomás de Aquino es posible encontrar cierta tensión textual en torno a la posibilidad de conocer de manera natural la esencia divina. Por un lado el teólogo parece afirmar que, precisamente, no podemos conocer acerca de Dios qué es, sino solo qué no es. Pero, por otra parte, existe evidencia textual de que habría sostenido la posibilidad de un conocimiento quiditativo imperfecto. En tanto y en cuanto el matiz más positivo suele aparecer con (...) mayor énfasis en el tratamiento de los problemas relativos al lenguaje, un gran número de comentadores (desde E. Gilson hasta, más recientemente, D. Burrell, G. Rocca y R. Accar) ha expresado una tentencia a circunscribir la tensión al ámbito linguistico o judicativo. Tomás, de acuerdo a estos autores, nunca habría sostenido que es posible tener un conocimiento quiditativo natural de la esencia divina. En palabras de E. Gilson: -/- “Hacer decir a Santo Tomás que tenemos un conocimiento por lo menos imperfecto de lo que Dios es, significa traicionar su pensamiento, tal como él lo ha formulado repetidas veces” 1 -/- El énfasis de estos autores, bien considerado, esta puesto en la tesis ciertamente defendida por Tomás de que la esencia divina es naturalmente incomprehensible. Los autores reaccionan específicamente contra la teoría del concepto análogo desarrollada originalmente por el cardenal Cayetano. Según interpretan, el concepto análogo se reduciría, en última instancia, precisamente, a un concepto comprehensivo. En este trabajo intentaremos volver a revisar la posición de Tomás sobre el conocimiento quiditativo natural desde sus bases. A nuestro entender el teólogo medieval ha sostenido desde sus obras más tempranas que es posible un conocimiento natural quiditativo -si bien imperfecto. Interpretamos que ese conocimiento incluye la posibilidad de representarnos, aunque de manera deficiente, la esencia divina. Defendemos, consecuentemente, la posibilidad de formarnos conceptos, siempre deficientes, claro, de la misma, distintos, por supuesto, de los conceptos análogos. Y sostenemos que la tesis de que la interpretación de la teoría epistemológica tomista en la que el sentido precede a la verdad judicativa no atenta contra la tesis de que Dios es, finalmente incomprehensible. (shrink)

En la teoría epistémica de Tomás de Aquino la lumen rationis desempeña la función de causa última del inventario completo del conocimiento humano natural. La tesis de acuerdo a la cual esa luz es puesta en nosotros por Dios justifica, de acuerdo al autor, la aserción de que la divinidad es el único y auténtico maestro interior del hombre. Ahora bien, en la visión beatífica la lumen naturale es perfeccionada por una luz sobrenatural, y la unión cognitiva con lo conocido (...) tiene lugar por la presencia real de Dios mismo en el entendimiento humano, única instancia en la que resulta conocido tal como es. Restringidos, en cambio, al modus intelligendi natural, la presencia cognitiva de la realidad divina solo puede ser representacional y, por lo tanto, según el autor, limitada, lo que repugna esencialmente a la divinidad. La esencia divina, en este caso, solo puede ser concebida de manera deficiente: por espejo y en enigma. En este trabajo intentamos explorar las diferencias entre ambos tipos de cogniciones tomando en cuenta los dos modos correlativos en que Dios nos enseñaría acerca de sí: ya de manera perfecta, como en la visión beatífica, ya de manera obscura, es decir, en enigma. (shrink)

Il contributo si concentra sull'aenigma del gioco della palla, presentato da Cusano come un'esperienza mistica che si sviluppa nell'arco dell'esistenza vissuta. Nel De ludo globi, difatti, il moto dell'anima verso la conoscenza di Dio è paragonato al movimento della palla, che nel gioco viene lanciata da mano umana verso il centro del cerchio. Ugualmente nell'uomo l'intelligenza si muove tanto più la palla-anima diviene rotonda, ossia, tanto più viene levigata e così purificata dalle sue imperfezioni: in tal modo essa può correre (...) libera dagli impedimenti delle passioni. Il saggio mette dunque in evidenza le tematiche tipiche della tradizione platonica e della filosofia negativa: in effetti Cusano sottolinea che per esercitare l'anima intellettiva bisogna rimuovere i legami con il corpo e liberarsi dalle passioni (apháiresis), affinché l'anima resti sola con se stessa; nel suo intimo, nel fondo (Grund) essa diviene davvero libera e si apre così la visione della pianura della verità. Il movimento di conoscenza non è isolato dal contesto mondano, ma – al contrario – è da situare entro un uni-verso teoreticamente direzionato, dove al centro è situato «il regno della vita» e che, a cascata, si struttura in cerchi concentrici, tanto più lontani dal centro quanto meno illuminati dalla luce della Verità inattingibile: è “la mistica dei circoli”, che l'anima umana deve risalire fino all'unione nel centro. Per questa ragione le tappe del cammino di visione-ascesi-distacco divengono visibili nella coelesti Hierarchia mutuata da Dionigi Areopagita; a presidiare ogni livello di visione-ascesi-distacco, una differente figura angelica, che realizza la conoscenza a modo proprio, secondo le proprie possibilità. I nove cori, raggruppati in tre ordini sono perciò i livelli di distacco cui l'anima deve attraversare per intuire la Verità inattingibile realizzando la mistica unione di soggetto e oggetto della conoscenza. (shrink)

This chapter assesses the philosophical background to Thomas Aquinas’s interpretation of Proposition 1 from the _Liber de causis_ that “every primary cause influences its effect more than a secondary cause.” Aquinas claims to find the doctrine in Aristotle, although at first glance—and following some recent commentators—Aristotle himself does not seem to hold this causal principle, where contemporary commentators highlight Aristotle's departure from the Platonic hierarchy between a strictly-called 'cause' (αἰτία/αἴτιον) and instrumental or co-cause (συναίτιον). Despite this apparent opposition, I show (...) how Neoplatonists—particularly Proclus—develop certain strands of Aristotle's thought, where the latter tacitly accepts a distinction between primary and secondary efficient causes. Proclus' integration of Aristotle with Plato on causes leads to his formulation of the principle of primary/secondary causality, as adapted in the _Liber's_ Prop. 1: a key foundation for all medieval philosophical thought. (shrink)

In Book 2 of De Libero Arbitrio (Lib. Arb.), Augustine devises a proof of God’s existence and also seems to identify God with truth. In this paper, I reconstruct two distinct proofs: (1) Augustine’s proof of God’s existence and (2) his argument for the identification of God with truth. While scholars have long recognized that Augustine offers a proof of God’s existence in Lib. Arb. 2.14–39, the fact that he has two dialectical aims in this section of the dialogue has (...) been overlooked in the secondary literature. An upshot of disentangling these dialectical aims is that the two proofs turn out to be doctrinally neutral, resting not on any specifically Christian tenets, but rather on Augustine’s commitment to the existence of the intelligible Forms. (shrink)

This book argues that Thomas Aquinas succeeded in doing what previous Peripatetic philosophers failed to do, namely, articulate metaphysics as a science in the strongest or most rigorous sense of Aristotelian episteme. On Aquinas's account, metaphysics meets all the requirements for propter quid demonstrative knowledge laid out in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. As such, his claim that metaphysical knowledge is the most certain and highest form of knowledge naturally available to the human being appears to be internally justified in a way (...) that is unique in the history of philosophy . (shrink)

Terence Nichols recently pointed to three examples from modern science that seem to refute Aquinas’ doctrine of the unicity of substantial form: water in man, organ transplants, and the genetic material received from one’s parents. These examples are intended to demonstrate the quasi-independent existence of parts from the substantial form of the whole. Nichols proposes modifying Aquinas’s hylomorphism by adding a third category of form, which can be called subsidiary forms, subsidiary wholes, or holons. In simpler terms, a holon is (...) a semi-autonomous whole within a larger whole. Nichols’ overall argument suggests that we revise Thomistic metaphysics to account for these scientific findings. I argue that Nichols’ suggestion is unwarranted for two reasons. First, Aquinas argues that holons are a logical impossibility within his metaphysical framework. Second, while Nichols rejects the virtual presence of forms, this does not demonstrate a failure of the Thomistic account of substances within larger wholes. (shrink)

My titular question is cheeky enough. And there’s more where that came from. For God is a curious fellow. Even if we know what God is — absolute perfection, say — we don’t know much about what makes the Almighty tick. It is hard to say who God really is. In this article, I develop a guiding hypothesis by which to think about issues in this neighborhood. In four words: God has a personality. -/- In some recent co-authored work, I (...) have argued that the hypothesis of divine personality makes good sense and that it coheres well with perfect being theology and other apt theological constraints.[1] In this article, I’ll describe a specification of that hypothesis and show what work it can do. My goal is not so much to convince the reader that the hypothesis is true, but rather to inspire deeper reflection on the matter. But let’s start by saying more about what it means to claim that God has a personality. (shrink)

Jewish Philosophy and Kabbalah examines the encounter between philosophical reasoning, revelation, religious law, and mystical knowledge within Jewish intellectual history. The book traces this encounter from Philo of Alexandria and medieval Jewish rationalism to the emergence of Kabbalah, the Zoharic tradition, and Lurianic thought. Particular attention is given to Maimonides, negative theology, divine unity, creation, prophecy, biblical interpretation, moral responsibility, and the limits of human knowledge. Rather than assigning philosophy and mysticism to separate worlds, the book presents them as rival (...) and interacting responses to a common intellectual problem: how can human beings speak about God, interpret revelation, and act responsibly when the ultimate object of knowledge exceeds the capacities of reason? (shrink)

This paper analyzes the concluding book of Thomas of York’s Sapientiale, within the framework of the ongoing critical edition project. The complex relationships between manuscripts F, R, and V reveal an in fieri editorial situation and constant authorial revision. Drawing on textual and paratextual evidence, the study confirms the stemma proposed by Fiorella Retucci and Antonio Punzi and offers an integrative interpretation of the work. The paper shows that the editorial shifts reflect a deep doctrinal reconsideration of the project, grounded (...) in the maturation of the distinction between ens in generali and ens in speciali. This distinction is key to the inclusion and ordering of the final arguments, such as cosmology, celestial intelligences, and the soul. Finally, on the basis of the structure of manuscript V, the study supports the hypothesis that the correct numbering of the concluding book was originally the sixth rather than the seventh. (shrink)

This essay critically examines the enduring foundational logic within Western philosophy, arguing that even its most radical critiques of metaphysics ultimately reinscribe a principle of grounding—whether through presence, absence, event, or structure. From Plato and Aristotle to Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, and contemporary thinkers such as Deleuze, Foucault, Badiou, and Butler, the philosophical gesture remains tethered to a demand for origin and legitimacy. The essay proposes a symbolic alternative: the Ontology of Emerging Complexity. Drawing on Simondon’s theory of individuation and Whitehead’s (...) processual metaphysics, it reframes philosophy as a gesture of symbolic reinscription rather than revelation. Thought is no longer the discovery of essence but the operative reorganization of unstable matter. Philosophy becomes a transductive operator, translating empirical flows into symbolic structures without recourse to final principles. In this framework, truth emerges not from correspondence but from symbolic operativity. The essay calls for a non-foundational philosophy that listens to the real rather than seeks to ground it. (shrink)

Act, every act is an existence, an esse Thomas writes. Esse, to exist, is the proper activity of the act, of every act. St. Thomas repeats it on several occasions, to be (esse) is "the actuality of the act".

Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), one of the most important early modern scholastic philosophers, had considerable influence not only on canonical early modern philosophers such as Descartes and Leibniz, but even more so on subsequent scholastic philosophers and theologians. His _Metaphysical Disputations_ of 1597 was intended to provide the reader with a complete grounding in metaphysics and is one of the most detailed, comprehensive elaborations of an Aristotelian metaphysics ever published. This Critical Guide offers fourteen new essays on a wide range of (...) topics in the _Metaphysical Disputations_, including Suárez's metaphysics of modality, his nominalism, and his accounts of the categories, prime matter, falsity, time, and causation. The volume will be valuable for scholars and students of early modern scholasticism, and also for those researching later thinkers whose work was influenced by Suárez. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo, pretendo explorar la historia de una búsqueda de la filosofía medieval, que trasciende incluso su propia época, ya que condujo a la ciencia de lo material, dejó sentadas las bases para el futuro desarrollo de las ciencias y de la propia filosofía occidentales, ya en los tiempos modernos; y donde creo percibir la presencia de una constante: la búsqueda de lo individual, de lo singular, dentro de los conceptos filosóficos que el pensamiento medieval fue formando. Es (...) lo que llamo la Adversus Pluralitas de la filosofía escolástica occidental. Esta exploración la realizo tanto desde el punto de vista del análisis doctrinal como del contexto histórico, mediante el estudio de fragmentos de las obras de los más importantes representantes de la filosofía de la época medieval, así como de textos más recientes a ellos referidos. In the present work I intend to explore the history of a quest of medieval philosophy that transcends even its own era, since it led to the science of material things, laid the foundations for the future development of Western sciences and of philosophy itself, already in the modern age; and in which I believe I perceive the presence of a constant: the search for the individual, for the singular, within the philosophical concepts that medieval thought was forming. This is what I call the adversus pluralitas of Western scholastic philosophy. This research is carried out both from the point of view of doctrinal analysis and historical context, through the study of fragments of the works of the most important representatives of the philosophy of the Medieval time, as well as more recent texts referring to them. (shrink)

I begin by explaining the four contexts in which relations are discussed in Summa logicae, and giving some basic terminology. After explaining the difference between metaphysical realism and nominalism relevant to these contexts, I will briefly exposit the logical, theological, and methodological tools Ockham uses to obtain his own conclusions. Finally, I show where in the text he applies these tools to each of the four contexts, and close by speculating on the interesting differences between Ockham’s treatment of relations in (...) Summa logicae as opposed to his theological works. (shrink)

In one of his earliest dialogues, the Soliloquia, Augustine identifies the liberal arts (disciplinae) with truth (veritas), and employs this somewhat puzzling identification as a premise in his infamous proof of the immortality of the soul (Sol. 2.24). In this paper, I examine Augustine’s argument for this peculiar identification. Augustine maintains both (1) that the constituent propositions of the liberal arts are true, and (2) that the liberal art of dialectic (disciplina disputandi) is the “truth through which all disciplines are (...) true” (Sol. 2.21). I argue that Augustine identifies the liberal arts with truth because (1) the constituent propositions of the liberal arts are learned, and (2) dialectic’s structure is essential to the liberal arts. I further suggest that the subject matter of each liberal art reflects a distinct segment of intelligible reality, that is, the realm of the intelligible Forms. (shrink)

Aquinas presents his argument for the existence of an uncaused cause of all effects in his Second Way in the Summa theologiae as a deductively valid argument from premises known with certainty. This seems unwarranted, since the argument gives no reason for there being only one uncaused cause, and the reasons it gives for rejecting an endless causal regress seem unconvincing. These apparent shortcomings can be better understood by examining Aquinas’s metaphysics of causation, which is presupposed by the argument. He (...) uses a form of composition argument to justify the claim that endless per se causal series cannot exist. He does not argue against the possibility of a multiplicity of uncaused causes because he sees no rational grounds for entertaining this possibility. Given Aquinas’s metaphysical assumptions, it is correct to take the Second Way to be a deductively sound argument. (shrink)

RésuméLa «Concession à Avicenne», également connue sous le nom de septième chapitre du De substantia orbis, est l’une des nombreuses tentatives philosophiques d’Averroès visant à concilier la corporéité des corps célestes et leur éternité. La «Concession» contient un bref et rare clin d’oeil d’approbation à Avicenne, d’où le titre sous lequel elle a été diffusée. L’ouvrage, perdu en arabe, nous est parvenu grâce à la traduction hébraïque de Ṭodros Ṭodrosi datant de 1340, à partir de laquelle la traduction latine d’Abraham (...) de Balmes a été réalisée au début du xvie s. La présente contribution propose, pour la première fois, une édition du texte hébreu et de sa traduction latine originale (avant sa révision éditoriale pour l’editio princeps de 1525), ainsi qu’une introduction, une analyse philosophique, une traduction anglaise et un glossaire. (shrink)

Heidegger's ontological theories, his observations about liberalism and fascism, and his evaluation of Being are three premises of an argument for fascism. The ontological premise is that integrated wholes and instruments or objects of will are ontologically superior, as Being and Time suggests in discussing Being‐a‐whole and using tools. The social premise is that fascist societies are wholes integrated by dictatorial will, while liberal societies are looser aggregates of free individuals, as Heidegger describes in his 1930s seminars. The evaluative premise, (...) shared with the medieval tradition and expressed in his notebook remarks about war, is that ontological superiority makes things better. The conclusion that fascism is better than liberalism should be rejected along with the evaluative premise. (shrink)

Aquinas’ Summa contra Gentiles (SCG), in its apologetic discourse aimed at Jews and Muslims of the Latin Christendom, strategically engages with Islamic and Jewish sages of its scholastic era. Since existing scholarship has not sufficiently qualitatively and quantitatively evaluated Aquinas’ most frequently referenced Islamic and Jewish philosophers in SCG, leaving a significant scholarly lacuna, this study addressed the gap by analyzing Aquinas’ direct references to and argumentative engagements with Avicenna, Averroes, Maimonides, and Avicebron, showing their distribution, Aquinas’ argumentative stance of (...) agreements, partial agreements/disagreements, or disagreements, and purpose of these reference-based arguments, categorized as either Aquinas’ aim to refute the referenced proposition or utilize it to support, build upon, and advance his thesis. The methodology employed a dual analytical approach, consisting of a qualitative textual-philosophical analysis of the SCG text in the scholarly authoritative Editio Leonina, cross-verified against Vansteenkiste’s studies and Busa’s Index Thomisticus, followed by a quantitative assay. The results revealed that Aquinas directly referenced the Islamic and Jewish philosophers 61 times in the SCG’s 415 Capitula. Islamic philosophers (95%) Averroes (64%) and Avicenna (31%) are the most prominent. In contrast, Jewish philosophers, Maimonides and Avicebron, comprise only a minor fraction. These references are concentrated in SCG II, followed by SCG III and SCG I. The SCG IV, which deals with the Latin Catholic dogmatic theology, has only one direct reference to Avicenna. Aquinas often engaged with these philosophers through argumentative disagreements (81%), primarily based on Averroes’ arguments and secondarily on Avicenna’s. However, he never refuted the relatively few agreements (14%) and partial agreements (5%), instead utilizing them to build upon, advance, and support his thesis. Aquinas never agreed with Maimonides and Avicebron and always used these argumentative disagreements to refute their philosophical propositions. This pattern exhibits a strong correlation between Aquinas’ argumentative agreement level and purpose of direct reference-based argument, illustrating the Thomistic method of theological discernment, characterized by Aquinas’ selective appropriation, adaptation, and adoption of the other two Abrahamic traditions’ philosophies when compatible with the Latin Church’s teachings, and systematic refutations when incompatible, terming them ‘errors’ that must be countered. This study demonstrates that the Thomistic theological synthesis of Islamic and Jewish philosophy in Aquinas’ SCG Sacra Doctrina not only strengthened Thomistic theology and defended the Roman Catholic faith but also succeeded in bridging the three Abrahamic monotheistic traditions, Christian, Islamic, and Jewish, through their shared Peripatetic philosophy of universal truth, the truth that commences in God. (shrink)

Developed out of earlier work on Aristotelian topics, syllogistic, and fallacies, by the early fourteenth century the medieval theory of consequence came to provide the first unified framework for the treatment of inference as such. With such a development came the task of unifying the various justifications for inferences treated in earlier frameworks. Prior to the appearance of theories of consequences, the task of providing a real foundation, or grounding, for good inferences is shared between theories of demonstration, such as (...) those provided in commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, and theories of topical inference, passed on to the medievals via Boethius. But by the time of the earliest consequentiae, most consequences were grounded in the theory of supposition, which began its own development in the twelfth century. Secondary literature on supposition has generally held that in the most common form of supposition, personal supposition, a term is taken to stand for individuals falling under it. In this paper, I show that for the earliest consequentiae this is false: prior to William of Ockham’s work, personal supposition could also involve descent to concepts or types falling under a term, previously thought to be the exclusive provision of simple supposition. As such, a greater variety of ways of grounding consequence exists in the period than has hitherto been recognized. (shrink)

This volume is a tribute to Fr. John F. Wippel. Following the philosophical order that Aquinas might have adopted "had he chosen to write a Summa metaphysicae"—an order that Wippel himself lays out in his Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas—these essays unfold new research on some of the most intriguing topics in Aquinas’s metaphysics, from the most recent generation of scholars formed by Wippel’s pioneering work. The contributors address the discovery of being qua being via separation (Gregory T. Doolan), propter (...) quid metaphysical demonstrations (Philip Neri Reese), the origins of the controversies about the real distinction between essence and esse (Mark Gossiaux), a defense of essence-realism as a key to the real distinction (David Twetten), the relationship of likeness and agency (Therese Scarpelli Cory), created form as act and potency (Stephen Brock), the variation of accidental forms (Gloria Frost), the possibility of angelic judgment (Francis Feingold), argumentation for the existence of God (Gaven Kerr), the propriety of " Qui Est" as a Divine Name (Brian Carl), ‘Beauty’ as a Divine Name (Michael Rubin), and God’s application of creaturely powers to action (Jason Mitchell). (shrink)

*I am turning this dissertation into a monograph. Please contact me if you will cite it. Comments and questions are welcome!* -/- Abstract: This dissertation discusses al-Fārābī’s views on unity presented in his Kitāb al-wāḥid wa-l-waḥda (Book of the One and Unity) (henceforth KW) by explaining them along with al-Fārābī’s wider metaphysical project and the earlier philosophical works that informed al-Fārābī’s views on unity. Al-Fārābī’s discussion of the senses of unity and multiplicity in KW has its origin primarily in Aristotle’s (...) discussion of unity and multiplicity in Metaphysics Δ.6, but there are some major differences between al-Fārābī’s discussion of unity and multiplicity in his KW and Aristotle’s corresponding discussion in the Metaphysics. This dissertation spells out two of these major differences. This dissertation has three chapters. In Chapter 1, I place KW in the context of al-Fārābī’s wider metaphysical project. I review al-Fārābī’s accounts of the subject-matter of metaphysics as a demonstrative science, and I explain how al-Fārābī implemented his understanding of what metaphysics deals with in a number of metaphysical works including KW. In Chapters 2 and 3, I explain the two major differences between al-Fārābī and Aristotle. In Chapter 2, I explain how and why al-Fārābī significantly changed Aristotle’s account of the one in number (hen arithmō(i) / kat’ arithmon = wāḥid bi-l-ʿadad). Unlike Aristotle, al-Fārābī explicitly distinguishes the senses of unity used in many-place contexts and those used in one-place contexts; for example, when we say that the point is one because it is not quantitatively divided, we use “one” in a one-place context, signifying a property of the point; on the other hand, when we say that Zayd and ʿAmr are one in species because they have the same species, we use “one” in a many-place context, signifying a relation between Zayd and ʿAmr. Al-Fārābī articulates his idea of unity in number so that it grounds all the senses of unity used in many-place contexts. His direct source for articulating his idea of unity in number is not Aristotle’s discussion of the one in number in the Metaphysics but it is Aristotle’s discussion of (the one and) the same in number in Topics I.7. In Chapter 3, I discuss the second major difference between al-Fārābī and Aristotle. Al-Fārābī’s senses of unity by virtue of circumscription (inḥiyāz) (by a place (makān) or by an extremity (nihāya) or by a quiddity (māhiyya)) do not have precedents in Aristotle. To put it briefly, X is said to be one by virtue of circumscription by Y because X has Y and nothing else in the relevant class has Y. So, Y ‘unifies’ X by containing it and separating it from other things. In this chapter, I clarify what al-Fārābī means when he talks about circumscription in general and circumscription by a quiddity in particular. Then, I discuss some texts from late antique Greek philosophers that likely provided starting points or confirmations for al-Fārābī’s ideas of unity by virtue of circumscription. Finally, I suggest that al-Fārābī’s motivation for developing this sense of unity and extending the idea of circumscription to the corresponding sense of being by virtue of circumscription by an extramental quiddity was to make better sense of the argument for the equivalence between being and unity that Aristotle presents in Metaphysics Γ.2 and Iota 2. In addition to several topical appendices, this dissertation contains an English translation of KW as an appendix. (shrink)

Al-Fārābī’s discussion of the senses of unity in Kitab al-Wāḥid wa-l-Waḥda (Book of the One and Unity) (henceforth KW) has its origin mainly in Aristotle’s discussion of the senses of unity and multiplicity in Metaphysics Delta 6 and Iota, but there are some major differences between al-Fārābī’s discussion of unity and multiplicity in his KW, and Aristotle’s corresponding discussion in the Metaphysics. This paper explains one of these major differences, namely al-Fārābī’s treatment of the sense of unity in number (al-waḥda (...) bi-l-ʿadad). I try to show that unlike Aristotle, al-Fārābī is interested in explicitly distinguishing the senses of unity that are used in one-place contexts (monadic) from those which are used in many-place contexts (polyadic), and that al-Fārābī articulates his sense of unity in number with the features needed for it to perform a special function of grounding all the senses of unity used in many-place contexts. In other words, to put it roughly, two things, X and Y, are said to be one because something about them, Z, is one in number. For example, Zayd and ʿAmr are one in species, which is one of the senses of unity used in many-place contexts, and they are one in species because their species, the human kind, is one in number. I spell out the features with which al-Fārābī articulates his sense of unity in number for it to perform this function of grounding all the senses of unity used in many-place contexts. Finally, I argue that al-Fārābī develops his sense of unity in number with these features not from Aristotle’s discussion and use of unity in number in the Metaphysics primarily, but rather, al-Fārābī’s primary source is Aristotle’s discussion of sameness in number in Topics I.7. (shrink)

According to standard late medieval Christian thought, humans in heaven are unable to sin, having been “confirmed” in their goodness; and, nevertheless, are more free than humans are in the present life. The rise of voluntarist conceptions of the will in the late thirteenth century made it increasingly difficult to hold onto both claims. Peter Olivi suggested that the impeccability of the blessed was dependent upon a special activity of God upon their wills and argued that this external constraint upon (...) their wills did not eliminate their freedom. Later voluntarists largely agreed with Olivi in attributing the confirmation of the blessed to be dependent upon God’s activity in some way, but disputed the means by which and the extent to which the wills of those in heaven could be said to retain their freedom. This paper will examine various attempts made to either harmonize these two claims or else to soften the blow of rejecting one of them; among the authors surveyed will be Peter John Olivi, John Duns Scotus, Henry of Harclay, William of Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Margurite Porete. (shrink)

Contemporary scholarship is divided over whether Anselm maintains a version of Eudaemonism. The debate centers on the question of whether the will for justice only moderates the will for happiness or, instead, provides a distinct end for which to act. Because of two key passages, various scholars hold that Anselm maintained elements of medieval Eudaemonism. In this article, I argue that Anselm separates morality from happiness, and I provide a sketch of his alternative view. First, I argue against some recent (...) perspectives that Anselm maintained Eudaemonism. To do so, I provide a non-Eudaemonist reading of the two key passages and show how Eudaemonist readings are lacking in different respects. Second, I examine what this argument means for Anselm’s understanding of happiness and moral obligation. While there are some Eudaemonist themes in Anselm’s thinking, he flatly denies and revises aspects of the system. (shrink)

Évoquer Dante Alighieri (v. 1265-67 – 1321), c’est avant tout penser au poète de la Divine Comédie, mais c’est souvent oublier qu’il fut aussi un philosophe médiéval. C’est ce que fait (re)découvrir Ruedi Imbach dans son opuscule paru chez Vrin en 2023. Il y regroupe quatre articles afin de démontrer que Dante se considérait lui-même comme un philosophe, et que l’histoire de la philosophie peut à bon droit s’en souvenir ainsi. Il ne s’agit pas là d’une simple querelle de titre, (...) puisque ce double regard, à la fois philosophique sur son œuvre poétique et critique sur son œuvre philosophique1, permet de découvrir une pensée plus méconnue de cette période, surtout dominée par les universitaires parisiens. Nonobstant sa forme de compilation, l’ouvrage s’articule autour des grands axes présentés dès les premières pages : l’analyse touche à la conception du langage chez Dante, à sa philosophie politique et au dialogue qu’il entretient avec la tradition philosophique. À travers chaque sujet, Imbach soutient que le fil conducteur de la pensée de Dante est l’élévation, à rebours de ses contemporains, de l’éthique au-dessus de la métaphysique. (shrink)

This contribution in honor of the life, work, and teaching of Fr. Wippel aims to show that the argument Aquinas gives in ST I.44.1 ad 1 for the conclusion that all beings are created is a genuinely propter quid metaphysical argument.

This contribution proposes an interpretation of Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy of mathematics. It is argued that Aquinas’s philosophy of mathematics is a coherent view whose main features enable us to understand it as a moderate realism according to which mathematical objects have an esse intentionale. This esse intentionale involves both mathematicians’ intellectual activity and natural things being knowable mathematically. It is shown that, in Aquinas’s view, mathematics’ constructive part does not conflict with mathematical realism. It is also held that mathematics’ imaginative (...) reasoning is coherent with Aquinas’s doctrine of formal abstraction and his realism. It focuses on some of Aquinas’s texts, which it places within their textual and doctrinal context and interprets them in the light of some historical elements. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, contrary to what one might think, early modern rationalism displays an increasing and well-grounded sensitivity to certain metaphysical questions substantial form was designed to answer—despite the fact that the notion itself was in such disrepute, and emphatically banished from natural philosophy. This main thesis is established by examining the thought of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz through the framework constituted by what have been designated as the two aspects, metaphysical and physical, of substantial form. This (...) examination shows that Descartes ends up assigning to soul a notable metaphysical task formerly assigned to substantial form, whereas Spinoza advances a theory of essences motivated by the philosophical concerns behind the two aspects of substantial form. Leibniz finally makes a sharp distinction between natural philosophy and metaphysics as he develops a dynamistic theory that deliberately aims at understanding substantial form in a new fashion. This line of development is designated as one major factor contributing to the separation of philosophy and natural science. (shrink)

This dissertation is a study of John Buridan's (c.1300-c.1361) conception of modalities. Modal concepts - concepts of necessity, possibility, impossibility, and contingency - describe the ways in which things could and could not be otherwise. These concepts became notoriously central for philosophical discourse in the late Middle Ages. In recent years, Buridan's philosophy and modal theory have received sophisticated scholarly attention. The main contribution of the dissertation is to show new ways in which Buridan's modal theory is embedded in its (...) contextual practical aims, as providing methods for argumentation schemes and analysis used in his natural philosophy and metaphysics. The dissertation is divided into two parts. In Part I, I conduct a detailed analysis of Buridan's account of varieties of modality in logical contexts. In Chapter 2, I show that Buridan distinguishes between broad and restricted forms of necessity in his treatment of logical consequence. Moreover, I show how the distinction between these forms of necessity underpins his modal syllogistics. I argue in Chapter 3 that Buridan acknowledged a variety of modal concepts that are distinguished as a matter of degree. I identify the main modal concepts Buridan's theory reckons with, show how he motivates the distinctions among them, and clarify how they are logically related. Part II turns to applications of Buridan's modal analyses to natural philosophy. In Chapter 4, I address the relationship between necessity with sempiternal truth in Buridan's commentary on Aristotle's De Caelo and compare Buridan's treatment of a key passage in that commentary with the treatment by John of Jandun (c. 1285-1328), a near-contemporary master of arts at Paris. Chapter 5 focuses on Buridan's account of the relationship between power-based concepts of modality and his modal semantics. Chapter 6 describes Buridan's account of contingency in the Physics, and sets Buridan's account of the relationship between forms of contingency and chance against the background of a received debate between Avicenna's and Averroes' views on the subject. Finally, in Chapter 7, I analyse some important applications of Buridan's distinction between logical and metaphysical possibility in physical contexts. I conclude this section by showing how Buridan considered merely conceivable possibilities useful in natural philosophy, and draw further conclusions for investigating the connections between logic and natural philosophy in the later Middle Ages. (shrink)

“More than any other living scholar of medieval philosophy, Gyula Klima has influenced the way we read and understand philosophical texts by showing how the questions they ask can be placed in a modern context without loss or distortion. The key to his approach is a respect for medieval authors coupled with a commitment to regarding their texts as a genuine source of insight on questions in metaphysics, theology, psychology, logic, and the philosophy of language—as opposed to assimilating what they (...) say to modern doctrines, or using medieval discussions as a foil for ‘new and improved’ conceptual schemes.” Jack Zupko, University of Alberta “Gyula Klima is widely recognized as one of the world’s leading experts on thirteenth and fourteenth-century Latin philosophy, with his own, distinctive analytic approach, which brings out both the similarities and differences between medieval and contemporary logic and semantics.” John Marenbon, Trinity College, University of Cambridge “Gyula Klima has been a towering figure in the field of medieval philosophy for decades. His influence comprises not only the scholarly results of his work, but also intense and generous mentorship of students and junior colleagues. This volume is a perfect reflection of the esteem that he enjoys around the world, collecting excellent pieces by established as well as up-and-coming scholars of medieval philosophy.” Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam “For four decades now, Gyula Klima has been setting the standard among medievalists for philosophical sophistication and historical rigor. This collection of wide-ranging studies from leading scholars in the field offers a worthy tribute to that legacy.” Robert Pasnau, University of Colorado Boulder Gyula Klima is Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University, and Senior Research Fellow, Consultant, and the Director of Institute for the History of Ideas of the Hungarian Research Institute in Budapest. In 2022, the President of Hungary awarded him the Knight’s Cross of the Hungarian Order of Merit, “in recognition of his outstanding academic career, significant research work and exemplary leadership.” In this volume, colleagues, collaborators, and students celebrate Klima’s project with new essays on Plotinus, Anselm, Aquinas, Buridan, Ockham and others, exploring specific questions in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and logic. No contemporary surpasses Kripke and Klima in semantics and metaphysics, but only Gyula Klima’s thought ranges flawlessly over classical philosophy as well. The volume is a fitting tribute to the master. David Twetten, Marquette University. (shrink)

A main function of common natures in Avicenna’s metaphysics is supposed to be providing an objective ground for the categories. Thus, it is commonly assumed that in his metaphysics things are objectively divided into the categories into which they are because members of each category share the same common nature. However, common natures cannot perform the function unless they are shared, in a real sense of the word, by the members of the respective categories, and it is not clear at (...) all in what real sense Avicenna took common natures to be shared by them. On the one hand, he rejected Platonic and Aristotelian realisms about common natures, the two standard accounts of how common natures are shared by their instances. On the other hand, it is unclear that his alternative account(s) of common natures renders them genuinely common. The primary goal of this paper is to examine whether Avicenna’s common natures can provide an objective ground for the categories. It considers various interpretations of Avicenna's account and argues that they are either incorrect interpretations of Avicenna or do not render common natures genuinely common. It concludes with proposing to look elsewhere in Avicenna’s system to find the objective ground. (shrink)

There is a theological puzzle concerning the way in which Satan – an angel – was able to sin, despite lacking knowledge of no relevant fact about the world. Anselm and Aquinas explain Satan’s sin as malicious in virtue of Satan’s indifference to what mattered. I appeal to their account of Satan’s sin as a paradigm case clarifying the way in which those who intentionally engage in nonconsensual sex are always acting maliciously. Assuming competence, those who engage in nonconsensual sex (...) fail to attend to what matters and are willing to harm others merely for their own gratification. Such attitudes are diabolical. (shrink)

All adherents of hard determinism face a number of steep challenges; those with traditional religious commitments face still further challenges. In this paper I treat one such further challenge. The challenge, in brief, is that given hard determinism, it’s very difficult to say why God couldn’t, and why God wouldn’t, just immediately and directly realize the final end of creation. I develop the challenge, and a number of solutions, through the work of the medieval Jewish philosopher, Hasdai Crescas. After arguing (...) that Crescas is indeed a hard determinist, and showing that he forecloses all the easy solutions to our challenge, I piece together from his work two solutions. They both start from the assumption that the purpose of creation is creaturely love of God. Each then lays down a constraint on proper love of God, which can be satisfied only if God demands of us to realize some state of affairs other than loving Him. (shrink)

This article expands our knowledge of the historical-philosophical process by which the dominant metaphysical account of the Christian God became ascendant. It demonstrates that Marius Victorinus proposed a peculiar model of ‘consubstantiality’ that utilised a notion of ‘existence’ indebted to the Aristotelian concept of ‘prime matter’. Victorinus employed this to argue that God is a unity composed of Father and Son. The article critically evaluates this model. It then argues that Augustine noticed one of the model's philosophical liabilities but did (...) not publicly name Victorinus when he rejected it in De Trinitate, thereby exemplifying the practice of private ‘rebuke’ (ἐλέγχɛιν). (shrink)

The 16th and 17th centuries witnessed a philosophical shift that would help pave the way for modern science, a shift from metaphysical theories of material objects to other views embracing only the empirically-accessible parts of material things. One much-debated topic in the course of this shift was regarding prime matter. The late scholastic Jacobus Zabarella (1533-1589) arrived upon his views about prime matter via his version of the regressus method, a program for a sort of scientific reasoning. In his De (...) rebus naturalibus, Zabarella defends the position that prime matter is extended. However, it is less clear how he accounts for its extension. There is an important text where he apparently suggests that prime matter is extended in and of itself. However, there are two other texts apparently stating that matter is extended in virtue of a distinct accident in the category of quantity. I argue that a decisive reading based solely upon any particular texts is not available. Nevertheless, examining Zabarella’s writing on the topic as a whole, the trajectory of his overall argument is remarkably sympathetic to Averroes, who famously took the accidentally quantified position. Thus, from this systematic feature, the accidentally quantified reading is more reasonable. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Aquinas’ account of analogy provides resources for resolving the prima facie conflict between his claims that (1) the divine relations constituting the persons are “one and the same” with the divine essence; (2) the divine persons are really distinct, (3) the divine essence is absolutely simple. Specifically, I argue that Aquinas adopts an analogical understanding of the concepts of being and unity, and that these concepts are implicit in his formulation of claims about substance (...) and relation in the Trinity. I then show how Aquinas appeals to key structural features of analogical concepts, notably, the simpliciter/secundum quid characterization, to resolve apparent conflicts between the unity of substance and distinction of relations in the Trinity. (shrink)

The paper delves into manuscript sources connected with various disputations held at Prague University from around 1390 to 1420 and singles out a set of hitherto unknown quaestiones dealing with the nature of the human intellect and its relation to the body. Prague disputations from around 1400 arguably offer a unique vantage point on late medieval anthropological issues, since they encompass an entanglement of numerous doctrinal influences from Buridanian De anima commentaries to John Wyclif’s theories. The paper delineates several conceptual (...) tensions regarding the nature of the intellect, e.g., between materialism (entailed by the emphasis on the intellect’s inherence in the body) and personal immortality. It presents several strategies Prague masters employed to overcome these tensions. For example, an anonymous participant of the 1409 quodlibet develops the Buridanian distinction between the rationally demonstrable materialist tendency and the indemonstrable “catholic truth” about the intellect both inhering in and separable from the body. On the other hand, Wyclif’s adherents (Jacob of Mies and another anonymous master) postulate an immortal spirit hypostatically united to each human being beside the human soul educed from the potency of the matter. Yet, the boundaries between the doctrinal standpoints in question seem permeable, whereby a rigid definition of antagonistic groups in late medieval Prague intellectual milieu (e.g., Buridanians vs Wycliffites) is rendered ineffective. (shrink)

The trends of Platonism which proved to be the most influential throughout the Renaissance were born roughly around the same period as the Greek corpus attributed to the Egyptian sage Hermes Trismegistus. They resulted from the rich intermingling of Greek philosophy with other Near Eastern cultures since the time of Alexander the Great. It is not by chance, then, that their fortunes were bound together until the Early Modern period. Legend has it that Cosimo de’ Medici was highly impressed by (...) the Platonic wisdom of the Greek émigrés visiting Florence in 1439, during the Council of Union between the Eastern and Western Churches, and particularly by the eminent philosopher George Gemistos Plethon. More than twenty years later, Cosimo entrusted a young Marsilio Ficino with the task of translating into Latin a Greek manuscript of Plato’s dialogues, possibly bequeathed by the Byzantine emperor, if not by Plethon himself. Before completing his rendering of the first series of ten dialogues, Ficino presented his elderly patron with the Pimander, a translation of fifteen Greek treatises on theology and occult lore by the “thrice greatest” Mercury or Hermes, believed to be the first in a venerable tradition of ancient sages which culminated in Plato. Certainly, these and similar newly recovered collections helped to shape and enrich the intellectual life of the emergent Renaissance. Their novelty and relevance, however, tended to be overstated in some historiographical perspectives. Fortunately, profound critical studies of the various sources from the Platonic, Neoplatonic, and Hermetic traditions have multiplied since the 19th century, gradually providing a clearer picture of the extent and nature of their influence on Renaissance and Early Modern scholars. Some of the most interesting topics discussed currently regard the lines of continuity between the medieval and Renaissance receptions of Platonism and Hermetism. Indeed, the Latin, Arabic, Hebrew, and Byzantine Middle Ages offer an immense repository of Platonic and Hermetic wisdom to Renaissance humanists and philosophers, which includes new theoretical and practical approaches, interpretative methods, translations, and commentaries. Only after elucidating these elements of continuity and change can one adequately ponder the distinctive character and originality of Renaissance Platonists and Hermeticists. Another hotly debated issue since Lynn Thorndike’s pioneering studies is the role of these ancient and medieval traditions in the development of experimental sciences and the emergence of the scientific revolution around the 16th and 17th centuries. (shrink)

Although Auriol’s philosophical psychology has received increasing attention among contemporary scholars in medieval philosophy, his use of connotation has gone largely unnoticed. The aim of this paper is to delve into Auriol’s definition of cognition as a connotation. In his view, cognizing is nothing more than making things appear to the mind. Each concept is the extra-mental particular plus its property of being cognized by or appearing to the mind. It is nothing other than a real individual co-signifying or connoting (...) its being conceived. Being thought as a connotation, then, for Auriol intellectual cognition ultimately describes the following experience: the appearance of something to and its conscious reception by a cognizer. (shrink)