Moorean Skepticism

International Journal of Philosophical Studies (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Moore is a skeptic and Descartes is the ultimate social epistemologist. Jonathan Ichikawa misses this, and as a result he inherits the problems of insularity and exclusion that plague other Moorean skeptics.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Moorean Skepticism.Emily Tilton Philosophy, Los Angeles, Ca & Usa - forthcoming - International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-9.
Skepticism, Mental Disorder and Rationality.Christos Kyriacou - 2023 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (1):1-30.
Skepticism and Political Conservatism.Robin McKenna & Chris Ranalli - 2025 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 16 (1):53-71.
Moore against the New Skeptics.William G. Lycan - 2019 - In On Evidence in Philosophy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 21-36.
Moorean Arguments and Moral Revisionism.Tristram McPherson - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2):1-25.
The Politics of Skepticism.Neil Levy - 2025 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 33 (2):122-127.
Immediate warrant, epistemic responsibility, and Moorean dogmatism.Adam Leite - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 158–179.

Analytics

Added to PP
2025-10-23

Downloads
643 (#89,590)

6 months
268 (#27,225)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Emily Tilton
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

Attitude Authority in the Age of AI.Benjamin Winokur - forthcoming - Asian Journal of Philosophy.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Epistemic Courage.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic anxiety and adaptive invariantism.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

View all 11 references / Add more references