Abstract

A lucid, scholarly, and largely historical study which seeks to show that Descartes' metaphysical system collapsed because it could not give an intelligible explanation of how substances interact or of how ideas represent their objects. It was Simon Foucher who first pounced on the internal conflict among Cartesian principles: the radical dualism between mind and matter could not be reconciled with the epistemological likeness principles according to which causes resemble their effects, ideas resemble their objects, as well as the principle that direct acquaintance is necessary for knowledge. Watson carefully studies the various vain attempts of Cartesians such as Desgabes to escape this difficulty, as well as Foucher's correspondence with Leibniz and his criticisms of Malebranche. Watson shows that the arguments originated by Foucher led by way of Bayle's Dictionnaire to those of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. There is an extensive bibliography and an appendix containing a schematic outline of the principles of late seventeenth century Cartesianism and of Foucher's criticisms.—S. A. S.