Epistemic agency: Some doubts

Philosophical Issues 23 (1):179-198 (2013)
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Abstract

Argues for a deflationary account of epistemic agency. We believe things for reasons and our beliefs change over time, but there is no further sense in which we are active in judgement, inference, or belief.

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10.1111/phis.12009

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Photo of Kieran Setiya
Kieran Setiya
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Self-Knowledge.Sophie Keeling - 2025 - In Kurt Sylvan, Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup, A Companion to Epistemology, 2 Volume Set. Wiley-Blackwell.
The Basing Relation.Ram Neta - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (2):179-217.
What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.
Epistemic Respect.Ripley Stroud - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Against the Taking Condition.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):314-331.

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References found in this work

Quotation.Herman Cappelen, Ernest Lepore & Matthew McKeever - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.

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