Abstract

Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority grounds the moral justification of authority in its capacity to help agents do what they have most reason to do. Critics of the service conception have argued that the service conception is inadequate as a conception of democratic authority because it cannot accord due weight to the role of democratic procedures in the justification of legitimate political authority. In this paper, I argue that the service conception can account for democratic procedures when respect for democracy is understood as a secondary reason to accept the legitimacy of an authority. The distinction between primary and secondary justifications of authority underlines my reply to the procedural democratic objection and sheds light on the meaning of ‘normal’ justification in the context of practical authority. Thus, in the paper, after introducing the service conception and its background theory of practical reason, I then examine and reject the arguments underlying the procedural democratic objection. The service conception highlights the limits of democratic authority, but it also illuminates the value of democracy and clarifies its role in a sound justification of legitimate authority.