Informal proofs and mathematical rigour

Studia Logica 96 (2):261-272 (2010)
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to provide epistemic reasons for investigating the notions of informal rigour and informal provability. I argue that the standard view of mathematical proof and rigour yields an implausible account of mathematical knowledge, and falls short of explaining the success of mathematical practice. I conclude that careful consideration of mathematical practice urges us to pursue a theory of informal provability

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2010-11-17

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Marianna Antonutti Marfori
University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

References found in this work

Informal Rigour and Completeness Proofs.Georg Kreisel - 1967 - In Imre Lakatos, Problems in the philosophy of mathematics. Amsterdam,: North-Holland Pub. Co.. pp. 138--157.
Visual Thinking in Mathematics.Marcus Giaquinto - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.
The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice.Paolo Mancosu - 2009 - Studia Logica 92 (1):137-141.
Why Do We Prove Theorems?Yehuda Rav - 1999 - Philosophia Mathematica 7 (1):5-41.

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