Virtual morality: transitioning from moral judgment to moral action?

Abstract

The nature of moral action versus moral judgment has been extensively debated in numerous disciplines. We introduce Virtual Reality (VR) moral paradigms examining the action individuals take in a high emotionally arousing, direct action-focused, moral scenario. In two studies involving qualitatively different populations, we found a greater endorsement of utilitarian responses–killing one in order to save many others–when action was required in moral virtual dilemmas compared to their judgment counterparts. Heart rate in virtual moral dilemmas was significantly increased when compared to both judgment counterparts and control virtual tasks. Our research suggests that moral action may be viewed as an independent construct to moral judgment, with VR methods delivering new prospects for investigating and assessing moral behaviour.

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References found in this work

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P.Werner Ziegenfuss & Gertrud Jung - 1978 - In Werner Ziegenfuss & Gertrud Jung, L - Z. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 244-318.

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