Preferences and Positivist Methodology in Economics

Philosophy of Science 83 (2):192-212 (2016)
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Abstract

I distinguish several doctrines that economic methodologists have found attractive, all of which have a positivist flavour. One of these is the doctrine that preference assignments in economics are just shorthand descriptions of agents' choice behaviour. Although most of these doctrines are problematic, the latter doctrine about preference assignments is a respectable one, I argue. It doesn't entail any of the problematic doctrines, and indeed it is warranted independently of them.

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Christopher Clarke
Erasmus University Rotterdam

Citations of this work

In Defence of Revealed Preference Theory.Johanna Thoma - 2021 - Economics and Philosophy 37 (2):163-187.
Preferences: neither behavioural nor mental.Francesco Guala - 2019 - Economics and Philosophy 35 (3):383-401.
A unificationist defence of revealed preferences.Kate Vredenburgh - 2020 - Economics and Philosophy 36 (1):149-169.

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References found in this work

Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
The scientific image.C. Van Fraassen Bas - 1980 - New York: Oxford University Press.
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. Armstrong - 1968 - Philosophical Quarterly 19 (74):73-79.

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