Abstract

This article examines the social contract of Thomas Hobbes in the critical context of the prisoner’s dilemma, with the aim of demonstrating that the tenability of the former is not undermined by the gravity of the latter. The urgency of the problem is that Hobbes postulates a social contract to formalize our collective transition from the state of nature to civil society, while the prisoner’s dilemma challenges both the mechanics and the outcome of that thought experiment. The source of the connection is that the incentives for reneging are presumably strong enough to keep rational persons from cooperating. This article argues that the prisoner’s dilemma undermines a position that Hobbes does not hold. It shows, in contrast, that the context and parameters of the social contract, particularly as envisaged by Hobbes, steer it safely between the horns of the dilemma. The main consideration toward that end is the central role of self-interest in the worldview of Hobbes, who thereby leaves plenty of room for progressive concessions toward peaceful coexistence, thus transforming the relevant model of rationality from utility maximization to utility satisficing, where contractors quickly learn to pursue a mutually satisfactory outcome instead of the best personal outcome.